How the Federal Reserve Can Avoid the Next Bubble

The central bank needs to watch asset prices and raise rates quickly when it decides the time is right.

From the Wall Street Journal

By IAN BREMMER AND NOURIEL ROUBINI

Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve face a number of very difficult challenges in the years ahead. They include:

• Resisting pressure to monetize deficits, which would eventually cause high inflation.

• Implementing an exit strategy from the massive monetary easing of the past year.

• Maintaining the Fed's independence, which has been compromised by the direct and indirect bailout of financial institutions and congressional attempts to micromanage the central bank.

• Properly calculating asset prices and the risk of asset bubbles according to the Taylor rule, an important guideline central banks use to set interest rates.

• Supervising and regulating the financial system more effectively, particularly in the role of "systemic risk" regulator.

The first two tasks are closely related. In order to prevent a persistent monetization of deficits that would lead to inflation, the Fed must implement an exit strategy from the unconventional monetary easing that began in late 2008. If the fiscal and monetary stimulus is taken away too soon, there is the risk of relapsing into deflation. If it is taken away too late, we may eventually face a fiscal crisis and an inflationary recession, or stagflation.

The Fed does not control fiscal policy. But to avoid a game of chicken wherein loose fiscal policy forces the Fed to monetize deficits to prevent a spike in bond yields, the Fed needs to pre-emptively state it won't be buying more Treasury bills.

As for the exit from monetary easing, the Fed must learn from the fateful mistake it made after the 2001 recession. Then, the central bank cut the federal-funds rate too much and kept it too low for too long. It also moved far too slowly when the normalization occurred—in small increments of 0.25% from summer 2004 until the summer of 2006, when it peaked at 5.25%. Normalization took two full years. It was in that period of slow normalization that the housing, mortgage and credit bubbles spiraled out of control. The lesson learned: When you normalize, move rapidly, or prepare for another dangerous bubble.

Of course, this is easier said than done. From 2002 to 2006, the Fed moved slowly because the recovery appeared anemic and because of significant deflationary pressures. This time around, the recession is more severe—unemployment is at 9.8% and is expected to peak above 10%, and we are experiencing actual deflation. Therefore, the incentive not to exit too soon will be greater and the risk of creating another bubble is greater. Indeed, the sharp increase in the stock market and commodities, and narrowing of credit spreads since March, are partly due to a wall of global liquidity chasing assets and already causing asset inflation.

If the conflict between economic growth and financial stability requires that monetary policy remain loose, then it is critical that the supervisors and regulators of the banking sector move aggressively to prevent another bubble from emerging. Thus they should quickly adopt the regulatory reforms agreed to by the G-20—including a new insolvency regime for financial institutions deemed "too big to fail," a serious approach to limiting "systemic risk," and appropriate rules governing incentives and compensation for bankers and traders.

It won't be easy to define systemic regulation and too-big-to-fail. There is a significant risk that doing so will provide an implicit guarantee for large and complex financial institutions. There is also a longer-term risk that actions taken by congressional and regulatory agencies will distort global financial markets. Western financial institutions now depend heavily on state financial backing, and several governments have tweaked rules and regulations to support the large financial institutions that are now at least partially taxpayer-owned. Further, governments could increasingly require domestic financial institutions to lend more at home, which will curtail their foreign operations. Creating a system of effective financial regulation—while resisting the impulse to favor domestic institutions—will be a real challenge for most countries, including the U.S.

Over time, once the fed-funds rate is normalized, incorporating asset prices into monetary policy making is also necessary to ensure financial stability. While it is correct that the fed-funds rates may not be the most effective instrument at controlling asset and credit bubbles, excessively cheap money is always a source of such bubbles. So faster normalization of the fed-funds rate will eventually be important.

The Fed's involvement in quasi-fiscal operations creates other challenges. As long as the Fed remains involved in maintaining financial stability and in preventing other episodes of systemic risk, it will be hard to eliminate the perception that the Fed will be involved as a lender of last resort for too-big-to-fail firms. So far, this Pandora's Box remains open.

The way to prevent future moral-hazard distortions is to create a regulatory regime where too-big-to-fail institutions have much higher capital requirements: a greater liquidity buffer, lower leverage, and lower involvement in risky and illiquid investments if they are depository banks. They should be supervised internationally and must be able to be closed down in an orderly fashion should failure loom.

The Fed is currently resisting a Treasury-led effort to review how it is organized out of concern it might forfeit its independence. Yet the governance structure of the New York and other regional Federal Reserve banks left them effectively controlled by large financial institutions last year, so such a review is necessary. While congressional interference in the Fed's jurisdiction is a danger, the recent quasi-fiscal activities of the Fed bear a review.

The Fed also needs a greater regulatory backbone. The Fed had the power to regulate mortgage markets but failed to use this power out of a misplaced deference to laissez-faire attitudes and Wall Street. Regulating mortgage markets requires a careful balance: short-term regulatory forbearance to avoid a greater credit crunch, along with medium-term countercyclical supervisory actions in order to prevent the emergence of further asset and credit bubbles.

Establishing financial stability—in addition to price stability and growth—is the essential role of the central bank. Achieving this goal in a way that avoids moral-hazard distortions, as with the too-big-to-fail finance institutions, and prevents another bubble in the next years will surely be one of the greatest challenges ever faced by the Fed.

Mr. Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, is co-author of the "The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing" (Oxford University Press, 2009). Mr. Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.

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STATEMENT ON U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK BY DR. NOURIEL ROUBINI

The following is a statement from Dr. Nouriel Roubini, Chairman of RGE Monitor and Professor, New York University, Stern School of Business:

“It has been widely reported today that I have stated that the recession will be over “this year” and that I have “improved” my economic outlook. Despite those reports - however – my views expressed today are no different than the views I have expressed previously. If anything my views were taken out of context.

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STATEMENT ON U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK BY DR. NOURIEL ROUBINI

“I have said on numerous occasions that the recession would last roughly 24 months. Therefore, we are 19 months into that recession. If as I predicted the recession is over by year end, it will have lasted 24 months with a recovery only beginning in 2010. Simply put I am not forecasting economic growth before year’s end.

“Indeed, last year I argued that this will be a long and deep and protracted U-shaped recession that would last 24 months. Meanwhile, the consensus argued that this would be a short and shallow V-shaped 8 months long recession (like those in 1990-91 and 2001). That debate is over today as we are in the 19th month of a severe recession; so the V is out of the window and we are in a deep U-shaped recession. If that recession were to be over by year end – as I have consistently predicted – it would have lasted 24 months and thus been three times longer than the previous two and five times deeper – in terms of cumulative GDP contraction – than the previous two. So, there is nothing new in my remarks today about the recession being over at the end of this year.

“I have also consistently argued – including in my remarks today - that while the consensus predicts that the US economy will go back close to potential growth by next year, I see instead a shallow, below-par and below-trend recovery where growth will average about 1% in the next couple of years when potential is probably closer to 2.75%.

“I have also consistently argued that there is a risk of a double-dip W-shaped recession toward the end of 2010, as a tough policy dilemma will emerge next year: on one side, early exit from monetary and fiscal easing would tip the economy into a new recession as the recovery is anemic and deflationary pressures are dominant. On the other side, maintaining large budget deficits and continued monetization of such deficits would eventually increase long term interest rates (because of concerns about medium term fiscal sustainability and because of an increase in expected inflation) and thus would lead to a crowding out of private demand.

“While the recession will be over by the end of the year the recovery will be weak given the debt overhang in the household sector, the financial system and the corporate sector; and now there is also a massive re-leveraging of the public sector with unsustainable fiscal deficits and public debt accumulation.

“Also, as I fleshed out in detail in recent remarks the labor market is still very weak: I predict a peak unemployment rate of close to 11% in 2010. Such large unemployment rate will have negative effects on labor income and consumption growth; will postpone the bottoming out of the housing sector; will lead to larger defaults and losses on bank loans (residential and commercial mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, leveraged loans); will increase the size of the budget deficit (even before any additional stimulus is implemented); and will increase protectionist pressures.

“So, yes there is light at the end of the tunnel for the US and the global economy; but as I have consistently argued the recession will continue through the end of the year, and the recovery will be weak and at risk of a double dip, as the challenge of getting right the timing and size of the exit strategy for monetary and fiscal policy easing will be daunting.

“RGE Monitor will soon release our updated U.S. and Global Economic Outlook. A preview of the U.S. Outlook is available on our website: www.rgemonitor.com”

Bob DeMarco is a citizen journalist and twenty year Wall Street veteran. Bob has written more than 700 articles with more than 18,000 links to his work on the Internet. Content from All American Investor has been syndicated on Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, Pluck, Blog Critics, and a growing list of newspaper websites. Bob is actively seeking syndication and writing assignments.

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Roubini Still Has Lingering Concerns About the Economy

In conclusion, the outlook for the U.S. economy remains very weak. The recent rally in global equities, commodities and credit may soon fizzle out as worse-than-expected earnings and financial news take their toll on this rally, which has gotten ahead of improvements in actual macroeconomic data.

Source: RGE Monitor Newsletter

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Lingering Concerns:

Labor market conditions are still quite dire, more than 3.4 million jobs have been lost in 2009 and about 6.5 million have been lost since the beginning of the recession. Compare this with the 2.5 million jobs lost in the recession of 2001; 1.5 million lost in the recession of the early 1990s; 3 million in the one of the early 1980s; 2.2 million in the one of the 1970s.

The pace of job losses has fallen from the 600K plus per month registered between December and March 2009 to about 350K in May and 467K in June; the average monthly job losses in this recession is now at about 360K. While the recent slowing of losses is a positive development, we have to put this in perspective: in previous post-war recessions, average monthly job losses have ranged between 150 thousand and 260 thousand. Moreover, average weekly hours in private nonfarm payrolls are at the lowest since 1964, as employers have cut employees’ hours. Job openings and turnover openings continue to fall and are at the lowest levels since 2000, indicating continued weakness in the economy.

The U.S. consumer is still the engine of U.S. growth, and contributes to over 70% of aggregate demand. While saving rates are headed for the high single digits and high oil prices together with long-term rates keep putting a dent in personal consumption, the over-leveraged consumer is finding some support in the tax breaks of the fiscal stimulus package. Yet the over-indebted U.S. consumer – whose deleveraging process yet has to start – will likely continue to put the brakes on consumption, while the savings rate continues to creep up. While this will encourage a rebalancing in the U.S. and global economy, in the medium-term it isn’t likely to support strong U.S. and global growth.

Housing starts appear to have stabilized and will likely move sideways for quite some time. However, housing demand is not yet improving at a pace that can guarantee that the lingering inventory overhang will dissipate. This implies that home prices will continue to fall. RGE Monitor expects home prices to continue to fall through mid-2010.

U.S. industrial production has been contracting for 17 months in a row – with a short break in October 2008. Industrial production usually finds a bottom shortly after the ISM manufacturing index does. While the index probably found its bottom back in December 2008--at depression levels of 32.9--industrial production remains in a mode of contraction that started in January 2008.

Financial conditions are showing some improvement. Banks are borrowing at zero interest rates and higher net interest margin can definitely help rebuild capital. Regulatory forbearance, changes in FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) rules and under-provisioning might enable banks to post better than expected results for a few quarters. However, relaxation of mark-to-market rules reduces the banks’ incentives to participate in the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) and therefore reduces the likelihood that the program will succeed in clearing toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets. The muddle-through approach might be successful in a scenario in which the U.S. and global economy recover soon and go back to potential growth during 2010, but according to RGE’s forecasts, this is highly unlikely. While we might have positive surprises coming from the banking system in the next couple of quarters, the situation could turn around again after that, jarring confidence in financial markets in a way that would spill into the real economy. Increases in the unemployment rate, well beyond the rates envisioned by the adverse scenario of the recent bank stress tests, imply that recapitalization needs are larger than what the too-lenient stress test prescribed. The U.S financial system – in spite of the massive policy backstop – thus remains severely damaged, and the credit crunch remains unlikely to ease very fast.

A sharp rise in public debt burden – the U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimates that the public-debt-to-GDP ratio will rise from 40% to 80% (in the next decade), or about $9 trillion – will also put a dent on growth. If long-term rates were to increase to 5%, the resulting increase in the interest rate bill alone would be about $450 billion, or 3% of GDP. The implication is that the fiscal primary surplus will have to be permanently increased by 3% of GDP, which could constitute further pressure on the disposable income of the U.S. consumer.

Not only does the U.S. economy face downward risks to growth in the medium-term, but potential growth might fall as well. The U.S. population is aging. With employment still falling – and another jobless recovery on the horizon – the rate of human capital accumulation will fall. Moreover, workers who remain unemployed for a long period of time lose skills, while young workers that enter the workforce, but don’t find a job, don’t acquire on-the-job skills. Reduced investments in worker training and education, coupled with lower capital expenditure, are a recipe for lower productivity ahead.

Deflationary pressures are still present in the U.S. economy. Demand is falling relative to supply and excess capacity is still promoting slack in the goods markets. Moreover, the rising slack in labor markets, which is pushing down wages and labor costs, implies that deflationary pressures are going to be dominant this year and next year. This implies that the Fed will keep monetary policy loose for a while longer. However, discussion of an exit strategy has to start now as investors’ concerns about the Fed’s ballooning balance sheet and expectations of inflation both mount.

There are also signs that a double-dip recession could materialize toward the second half of next year, or in 2011. If oil prices rise too much, too fast, too soon, that’s going to have a negative effect in terms of trade and real disposable income in oil-importing countries. Also, concerns about unsustainable budget deficits are high and are pushing long-term interest rates higher. If these budget deficits are going to continue to be monetized, eventually, toward the end of next year, there is a risk of a sharp increase in expected inflation that could push interest rates even higher. Together with higher oil prices, driven up in part by this wall of liquidity rather than fundamentals alone, this could be a double whammy that would push the economy into a double-dip or W-shaped recession by late 2010 or 2011.

In conclusion, the outlook for the U.S. economy remains very weak. The recent rally in global equities, commodities and credit may soon fizzle out as worse-than-expected earnings and financial news take their toll on this rally, which has gotten ahead of improvements in actual macroeconomic data.

Bob DeMarco is a citizen journalist and twenty year Wall Street veteran. Bob has written more than 700 articles with more than 18,000 links to his work on the Internet. Content from All American Investor has been syndicated on Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, Pluck, Blog Critics, and a growing list of newspaper websites. Bob is actively seeking syndication and writing assignments.

Original content All American Investor

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Roubini on Gold

Gold is a special commodity in that the fundamentals of physical supply and demand are minor influences on its price. Gold’s price is most often driven by speculative demand for a hedge against inflation or economic uncertainty. Many investors see gold as a substitute for fiat currencies. Consequently, gold prices sometimes track changes in central bank holdings of gold.

Gold markets largely ignored China’s surprise revelation that it had increased its gold reserves as much of this had already been priced in by speculators. Moreover, China produces its own gold. The increase in China's gold holdings is just a mere drop in the bucket of its total $1.9 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Gold's share in China's foreign exchange reserves remains much lower than the global average and well below the U.S. share. But China's interest in gold is consistent with its taste for real assets to gradually diversify from its U.S. bond-heavy portfolio. If other central banks followed suit, gold demand could increase sharply.

IMF gold sales will likely have little impact on gold prices if it sells its gold to central banks rather than the free market. The European Central Bank Gold Agreement’s expiration in September 2009 may have more impact. The signatories are likely to renew the agreement and continue limiting central bank gold sales. Fears that monetization of rising public debts will erode currency values may spark demand for gold as an inflation hedge.

Source RGE Monitor Newsletter and RGE Monitor

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Roubini on the U.S. Dollar and the Chinese Yuan

The Almighty Renminbi?

Now, imagine a world in which China could borrow and lend internationally in its own currency. The renminbi, rather than the dollar, could eventually become a means of payment in trade and a unit of account in pricing imports and exports, as well as a store of value for wealth by international investors. Americans would pay the price. We would have to shell out more for imported goods, and interest rates on both private and public debt would rise. The higher private cost of borrowing could lead to weaker consumption and investment, and slower growth.

Also see Roubini vs. Zhou on the U.S. Dollar and the Chinese Yuan

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Bob DeMarco is a citizen journalist and twenty year Wall Street veteran. Bob has written more than 500 articles with more than 11,000 links to his work on the Internet. Content from All American Investor has been syndicated on Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, Pluck, Blog Critics, and a growing list of newspaper websites. Bob is actively seeking syndication and writing assignments.

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Roubini: Economist Forecast on Economy Optimistic

Mild signs that the rate of economic contraction is slowing in the United States, China and other parts of the world have led many economists to forecast that positive growth will return to the US in the second half of the year, and that a similar recovery will occur in other advanced economies.

The emerging consensus among economists is that growth next year will be close to the trend rate of 2.5 per cent.

This consensus optimism is, I believe, not supported by the facts. Indeed, I expect that while the rate of US contraction will slow from -6 per cent in the last two quarters, US growth will still be negative (around -1.5 to -2 per cent) in the second half of the year (compared to the bullish consensus of +2 per cent).

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End of Economic Gloom? Not as Early as You Wish. Roubini’s latest Article for Project Syndicate

End of economic gloom? Nouriel Roubini

Mild signs that the rate of economic contraction is slowing in the United States, China and other parts of the world have led many economists to forecast that positive growth will return to the US in the second half of the year, and that a similar recovery will occur in other advanced economies.

The emerging consensus among economists is that growth next year will be close to the trend rate of 2.5 per cent.

Investors are talking of 'green shoots' of recovery and of positive 'second derivatives of economic activity' (continuing economic contraction is the first, negative, derivative, but the slower rate suggests that the bottom is near).

As a result, stock markets have started to rally in the US and around the world. Markets seem to believe that there is light at the end of the tunnel for the economy and for the battered profits of corporations and financial firms.

This consensus optimism is, I believe, not supported by the facts. Indeed, I expect that while the rate of US contraction will slow from -6 per cent in the last two quarters, US growth will still be negative (around -1.5 to -2 per cent) in the second half of the year (compared to the bullish consensus of +2 per cent).

Moreover, growth next year will be so weak (0.5 to 1 per cent, as opposed to the consensus of 2 per cent or more) and unemployment so high (above 10 per cent) that it will still feel like a recession.

In the euro zone and Japan, the outlook for 2009 and 2010 is even worse, with growth close to zero even next year. China will have a more rapid recovery later this year, but growth will reach only 5 per cent this year and 7 per cent in 2010, well below the average of 10 per cent over the last decade.

Given this weak outlook for the major economies, losses by banks and other financial institutions will continue to grow. My latest estimates are $3.6 trillion in losses for loans and securities issued by US institutions, and $1 trillion for the rest of the world.

It is said that the International Monetary Fund, which earlier this year revised upward its estimate of bank losses, from $1 trillion to $2.2 trillion, will announce a new estimate of $3.1 trillion for US assets and $0.9 trillion for foreign assets, figures very close to my own.

By this standard, many US and foreign banks are effectively insolvent and will have to be taken over by governments. The credit crunch will last much longer if we keep zombie banks alive despite their massive and continuing losses.

Given this outlook for the real economy and financial institutions, the latest rally in US and global stock markets has to be interpreted as a bear-market rally. Economists usually joke that the stock market has predicted 12 out of the last nine recessions, as markets often fall sharply without an ensuing recession.

But, in the last two years, the stock market has predicted six out of the last zero economic recoveries -- that is, six bear market rallies that eventually fizzled and led to new lows.

The stock market's latest 'dead cat bounce' may last a while longer, but three factors will, in due course, lead it to turn south again. First, macroeconomic indicators will be worse than expected, with growth failing to recover as fast as the consensus expects.

Second, the profits and earnings of corporations and financial institutions will not rebound as fast as the consensus predicts, as weak economic growth, deflationary pressures and surging defaults on corporate bonds will limit firms' pricing power and keep profit margins low.

Third, financial shocks will be worse than expected.

At some point, investors will realise that bank losses are massive, and that some banks are insolvent. Deleveraging by highly leveraged firms -- such as hedge funds -- will lead them to sell illiquid assets in illiquid markets. And some emerging market economies -- despite massive IMF support -- will experience a severe financial crisis with contagious effects on other economies.

So, while this latest bear-market rally may continue for a bit longer, renewed downward pressure on stocks and other risky assets is inevitable.

To be sure, much more aggressive policy action (massive and unconventional monetary easing, larger fiscal-stimulus packages, bailouts of financial firms, individual mortgage-debt relief, and increased financial support for troubled emerging markets) in many countries in the last few months has reduced the risk of a near depression. That outcome seemed highly likely six months ago, when global financial markets nearly collapsed.

Still, this global recession will continue for a longer period than the consensus suggests. There may be light at the end of the tunnel -- no depression and financial meltdown. But economic recovery everywhere will be weaker and will take longer than expected. The same is true for a sustained recovery of financial markets.

Nouriel Roubini is professor of economics at the Stern School of Business, New York University, and chairman of RGE Monitor. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.

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Bob DeMarco is a citizen journalist and twenty year Wall Street veteran. Bob has written more than 500 articles with more than 11,000 links to his work on the Internet. Content from All American Investor has been syndicated on Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, Pluck, Blog Critics, and a growing list of newspaper websites. Bob is actively seeking syndication and writing assignments.

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Roubini on PIPP

I received this via email from the RGE Monitor.

The following is a a extract and the complete text is included below.

Bottom line: Will it get credit flowing again?

The immediate market reaction (equities and investment grade CDS staged a substantial rally, less so high yield CDS) was clearly one of relief that nationalization seems to be off the table for now and that the administration is committed to market-based solutions. While the extent of the guarantees almost makes one wonder why the involvement of the private sector is needed in the first place, it is the involvement of the private sector that creates a context in which price setting and discovery happen based on a market mechanism.

An important question at this point is: What should we look at while assessing the plan in the months ahead?

Clearly the unfreeze of credit markets would be the first sign of success but we might not see this happening before some time. Some of the banks that choose to sell assets and take a writedown might be in need of additional capital before they can resume lending. Also, for those institutions that are beyond the stage of rescue and effectively insolvent, the plan will likely not be as effective in stimulating lending or participation in the first place.

The increase in the supply of credit that will come from institutions that are solvent will be important, but will demand be there to do its part? If the real side of the economy continues to deteriorate, it is likely that credit demand might be subdued. Moreover, a further continued deterioration on the real side of the economy would imply new defaults on credit cards, consumer loans, auto loans and mortgages that would result in new toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions recreating an environment where banks would maintain stringent lending standards. Therefore, the success of the plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get the economy back on a recovery path. The success of the fiscal stimulus package in sustaining aggregate demand and minimizing job losses and the success in restarting demand in the housing sector will be instrumental to put a stop to the negative feedback loop between the real and the financial side of the economy.

Moreover, if the negative feedback loop persists, need for further funding will arise. While it will be very challenging to obtain Congress approval for additional TARP money, we should point out that the government has set aside an additional $750bn in the FY2010 budget in aid for the financial sector.

Hence, taking care of legacy loans and securities is a welcome step forward, especially for solvent institutions whose asset values are subject to a substantial liquidity discount. However, insolvent institutions might not find as much relief from this plan, and the impact of the plan on the real economy might not be enough to pull the economy out of a contraction for good part of this year and sluggish growth thereafter. But by conducting auctions and determining the market value of the toxic assets, the Treasury will be implicitly using the private sector to ‘stress test’ the financial system to determine which banks are insolvent and therefore will need further government intervention.

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The main components of Treasury Secretary Geithner’s new PPIP to price and remove toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets are as follows:

Basic Principles: Treasury will use $75bn - $100bn in TARP money to co-invest alongside private sector participants and the FDIC as well as the Federal Reserve, to buy $500bn to $1 trillion of toxic mortgage assets (both residential and commercial) off banks’ books (‘legacy assets’)

There are two separate approaches for legacy loans and for legacy securities. At first, Treasury will share its $75-100bn equity stake equally between the two programs with the option to shift the bulk of financing towards the option with the greater promise of success with market participants.

1) Public-Private Program for Legacy Loans: The FDIC establishes several public-private investment funds whose sole purpose will be to purchase and hold specific loan pools put up for sale by banks (large and small). The transaction price will be established by the highest bid at an auction run by the FDIC, in which a wide array of institutional investors and even individuals with a long-term orientation are encouraged to participate. The liabilities of the investment fund consist of an equity stake (50% of which provided by auction winner, 50% from Treasury TARP), and collateralized debt issued by the investment fund and guaranteed by the FDIC to finance the remainder of the purchase price (FDIC gets guarantee fee). Before the auction, the FDIC specifies the pool-specific debt-to-equity ratio it is willing to guarantee subject to a maximum 6-to-1 leverage ratio. The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool - using asset managers approved and supervised by the FDIC - until disposal or maturity.

Example: Assuming a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio, the highest bid for a loan pool with $100 face value might turn out to be $84. Of this amount, the FDIC would provide $72 in debt guarantees whereas the equity stake of $12 would be shared equally between the auction winner ($6) and the Treasury ($6).

2) Legacy Securities Program: The legacy securities program is to be incorporated into the Term Asset-Backed Securities Facility (TALF) whose original goal was to provide collateralized financing (non-recourse loans) to buyers of newly created consumer loan/small business loan ABS. Under the Legacy Securities Program, the eligible collateral for TALF is extended to include non-agency RMBS that were originally rated AAA and outstanding CMBS and ABS that are rated AAA.

Example: Under the Legacy Securities Program, up to five Treasury-approved fund managers will have a period of time to raise private capital to target the purchase of designated securities. Assuming the fund manager is able to raise $100 of private capital for the fund, Treasury will provide $100 equity co-investment alongside private investors. Treasury will then provide a $100 loan to the public-private investment fund. Moreover, Treasury may also choose to provide an additional loan of up to $100 to the fund. The investment fund then has $300-$400 at its disposal to buy legacy securities at its discretion. As a purchaser of TALF-eligible securities, the PPIF would also have access to the expanded TALF program of collateralized Fed loans when it is launched.

Assessment

The main sticking points in previous market-based approaches to clear toxic assets from banks’ books were threefold:

a) How to value illiquid assets?
b) Once a transaction price is established, will banks be willing to sell and take a hair cut?
c) How to induce private investors to purchase legacy assets without unduly wasting taxpayer money?

a) Valuation of Illiquid Assets

The theoretical foundations of Geithner’s plan are provided by Lucian Bebchuk from Harvard University among others. He explains that “if the underlying market failure is at least partly one of liquidity, an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be designed. The key is to have competition at two levels.First, at the level of buying troubled assets, the government’s program should focus on establishing many competing funds that are privately managed and partly funded with private capital--and not creating one, large "aggregator bank"-- funded with public and private capital and engaging in purchasing troubled assets. Second, several potential fund managers should compete for government capital under a market mechanism resulting in maximum participation of private capital and minimum costs to taxpayers.”

Geithner’s plan seems to follow these guidelines to a large degree. In particular, on the one hand the government subsidy allows private investors to bid a higher price than otherwise warranted (i.e. the government gives investors the equivalent of a call option.) On the other hand, the fact that the private investor is bound to lose its entire equity stake if the asset value deteriorates from artificially high valuations provides an incentive to bid conservatively. Both effects together may contribute to a reasonable level of price discovery. In case of the securities program, the prospect of refinancing purchased legacy securities with TALF via a non-recourse loan (which is the equivalent of a put option) should incentivize private investors to bid higher than otherwise warranted.

b) Will banks participate?

A similar purely private solution to get toxic assets off banks’ balance sheets was tried with Paulson’s aborted Super-SIV when legacy assets were still marked substantially higher than at present. It became clear then that the private sector will require a possibly substantial taxpayer subsidy in order to overcome the collective action paralysis. Indeed, in the case of the legacy loan example outlined in the Geithner plan with a 6/1 leverage, private investors that invest 7.1% (=1/7 * 0.5) of the equity will get 50% of any upside in return. While Treasury will also share in any upside by half, any downside beyond the private investors’ equity stake is clearly borne by the taxpayers.

While this subsidy to investors provides a powerful incentive to bid prices up in a competitive auction, banks stuck with particularly toxic assets or thin capital buffers may still find a potential writedown at market-clearing prices prohibitive and some might need to be recapitalized after taking the hair cut. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair has already warned that while this plan will help many solvent banks get rid of their toxic assets thus clearing the way for new loans and fresh capital some banks are beyond the stage of rescue. Those borderline insolvent banks will likely require an additional incentive to sell or mandatory participation otherwise they will prefer to hold on to their assets, especially in view of the FASB’s prospective easing of mark-to-market accounting rules.

For the sake completeness, some commentators would also like to see better safeguards established in order to prevent banks and asset managers from potentially colluding in their common interest to the detriment of the taxpayer.

c) And taxpayers?

At the end of the day the performance of the toxic legacy assets is driven by the cash flow performance of the underlying loans. Keep in mind that among subprime borrowers, serious delinquencies and foreclosures have affected about 20% of outstanding loans as of December 2008 thus impairing the cash flow directed to junior RMBS investors and/or ABS CDOs consisting of these junior tranches. While ABX prices responded positively to the prospect of increased buyer interest, the ultimate loan value will depend on whether households and commercial real estate borrowers will continue making payments in the future. More on that below.

As a practical example of the performance of a toxic portfolio, take the Fed’s Maiden Lane portfolio with Bear Stearns assets. Cumberland Advisors reported that so far the results aren’t promising, and they see no prospect for a profit on the assets. In fact, the portfolio has lost over 10% of its value, and losses are mounting. At present, losses on that portfolio exceed $4.5 billion and the taxpayers’ share is now $3.5 billion. Others point to the low recovery value of IndyMac’s mortgage portfolio as a benchmark.


Bottom line: Will it get credit flowing again?

The immediate market reaction (equities and investment grade CDS staged a substantial rally, less so high yield CDS) was clearly one of relief that nationalization seems to be off the table for now and that the administration is committed to market-based solutions. While the extent of the guarantees almost makes one wonder why the involvement of the private sector is needed in the first place, it is the involvement of the private sector that creates a context in which price setting and discovery happen based on a market mechanism.

An important question at this point is: What should we look at while assessing the plan in the months ahead?

Clearly the unfreeze of credit markets would be the first sign of success but we might not see this happening before some time. Some of the banks that choose to sell assets and take a writedown might be in need of additional capital before they can resume lending. Also, for those institutions that are beyond the stage of rescue and effectively insolvent, the plan will likely not be as effective in stimulating lending or participation in the first place.

The increase in the supply of credit that will come from institutions that are solvent will be important, but will demand be there to do its part? If the real side of the economy continues to deteriorate, it is likely that credit demand might be subdued. Moreover, a further continued deterioration on the real side of the economy would imply new defaults on credit cards, consumer loans, auto loans and mortgages that would result in new toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions recreating an environment where banks would maintain stringent lending standards. Therefore, the success of the plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get the economy back on a recovery path. The success of the fiscal stimulus package in sustaining aggregate demand and minimizing job losses and the success in restarting demand in the housing sector will be instrumental to put a stop to the negative feedback loop between the real and the financial side of the economy.

Moreover, if the negative feedback loop persists, need for further funding will arise. While it will be very challenging to obtain Congress approval for additional TARP money, we should point out that the government has set aside an additional $750bn in the FY2010 budget in aid for the financial sector.

Hence, taking care of legacy loans and securities is a welcome step forward, especially for solvent institutions whose asset values are subject to a substantial liquidity discount. However, insolvent institutions might not find as much relief from this plan, and the impact of the plan on the real economy might not be enough to pull the economy out of a contraction for good part of this year and sluggish growth thereafter. But by conducting auctions and determining the market value of the toxic assets, the Treasury will be implicitly using the private sector to ‘stress test’ the financial system to determine which banks are insolvent and therefore will need further government intervention.

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Roubini on the Credit Crunch, Global Recession, and Deflation (Part Two)

Part two of Nouriel Rubini's speech at the 2009 CBOE Risk Management Conference. He discusses several topics including: the credit crunch, global recession, and deflation.

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Doctor Doom Nouriel Roubini: Stock Market to Go Much Lower

This is directly from an email I received from the RGE Monitor.

Roubini of RGE Monitor: Stock Market to Go Much Lower

Can we rule out another bear market rally some time in 2009?

No, we cannot rule out another bear market sucker’s rally in 2009, most likely in Q2 or Q3. The drivers of this rally will be the improvement in second derivatives of economic growth and activity in U.S. and China that the policy stimulus will provide on a temporary basis. Given the severity of macro, household, financial firms and corporate imbalances in the U.S. and around the world this Q2 or Q3 sucker’s market rally will fizzle out later in the year like the previous 5 ones in the last 12 months.

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What are the downside risks to these bearish predictions for U.S. and global equities?

On the downside there is at least a third probability of an L-shaped global near depression rather than the mere current severe U-shaped recession. If a near depression were to take hold globally a 40% to 50% further fall in U.S. and global equities from current levels could not be ruled out. But in this L-shaped near depression the last thing one would have to worry about would be stock markets as more severe issues would have to be addressed.

What are the upside risks to these bearish predictions for U.S. and global equities?

On the upside, we have an aggressive policy stimulus in the U.S. and other countries that might lead to a faster sustained economic and financial markets recovery that expected here. The bullish argument for a non-bear market and early persistent recovery of global equities is based on a better than expected recovery of the U.S. and global economy.

Bottom Line: P/E and S&P Index

Earnings per share (EPS) of S&P 500 firms will be in the $ 50 to 60 range, but they could fall to $40. The price earnings (P/E) ratio may fall in the 10 to 12 range in a U-shaped recession. If earnings are closer to 50 or the P/E ratio falls to 10 then the S&P could fall to 600 (12 x 50 or 10 x 60) or even to 500 (10 x 50). Equivalently the Dow (DJIA) would be at least as low as 7000 and possibly as low as 6000 or 5000.

Nouriel expounded the above topics further at the CBOE 25th Annual Risk Management Conference at Laguna Beach where he was the keynote speaker.

Read more of Nouriel’s and other RGE Monitor analysts’ views on the current economic and financial situation on www.rgemonitor.com or contact sales at info@rgemonitor.com.

Bob DeMarco is a citizen journalist, blogger, and Caregiver. Bob has written more than 500 articles with more than 11,000 links to his work on the Internet. The content has been syndicated on Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, Pluck, Blog Critics, and a growing list of newspaper websites. Bob is actively seeking syndication and writing assignments.

Bold Endeavors: How Our Government Built America, and Why It Must Rebuild Now

Nouriel Roubini Zombie Banks vs. Good Banks

Until banks can get healthy again, markets will continue to spiral downwards, says Jack Bouroudjian, chairman at Capital Markets Technology. Nouriel Roubini, chairman of RGE Monitor joins in the discussion with CNBC's Martin Soong.

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Roubini on Housing, Stimulus and Banks

Dr. Roubini discusses the housing recovery plan, bank bailouts, and the shape of the coming recession. His comments on the stimulus package and housing plan are mostly negative.

Is Roubini right on? Or is he becoming like the little boy crying wolf?

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Source: Firedoglake

Doctor Doom and the Black Swan Discuss the Economic Crisis

Roubini and Taleb discuss the economic crisis

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Doom & Gloom in 2009

An outlook for 2009, with Nouriel Roubini, Michael Spence, and Philip H. Knight.

Definitely worth your time.


Click here to watch and listen to Doom & Gloom in '09.

The Latest Bear Market Sucker’s Rally is Losing Its Steam as an Onslaught of Awful Macro and Earnings News Takes Its Toll

The information on this website is fantastic. Nouriel Roubini has been right on about the markets.
You will have to go through the registration process to get this story. It is free. They also have an excellent premium service.

I have been predicting for a while that the most recent bear market sucker’s rally would lose its steam and – like the previous bear market rallies in the last 18 months – US and global equities prices would head again towards new lows.

Let me now explain why…this will be the worst US recession in the last 50 years and the worst synchronized global recession in decades.