The Housing and Credit Crisis Explained

This presentation on the Housing and Credit crisis is the best I have seen. It explains everything from soup to nuts.

Each slide contains a graph that is well explained.

They say a picture is worth a thousand words.

Once you get through this, you will understanding the current credit crisis in housing, and what to expect in the years ahead.

If you take the time to view and read this you will be fully informed.

Hit the full screen button in the upper right hand corner of the panel below.

T2 Partners Presentation on the Mortgage Crisis

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Bob DeMarco is a citizen journalist and twenty year Wall Street veteran. Bob has written more than 500 articles with more than 11,000 links to his work on the Internet. Content from All American Investor has been syndicated on Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, Pluck, Blog Critics, and a growing list of newspaper websites. Bob is actively seeking syndication and writing assignments.

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Give Me Some of Dem Non-Recourse Loans--How the Toxic Asset Scheme Works

Duh, I want in. I want some of dem non-recourse loans.

You might be thinking what the heck? What is a non-recourse loan?

It is what you got when you took out a subprime mortgage. You put up a tiny down payment, zero. You purchased a $500,000 house (hopefully you did this in 2004, not 2006) for no money down and you now controlled $500,000 of real estate. If the value of the home went up, to say, $550,000 and you sold it, you made a gigantic return on your investment. Infinity, actually, since you put up nothing. What if the value of the home went down? Well this was the non-recourse part of your loan. You threw the keys on the table and walked away, and left the problem to your not so friendly neighborhood banker.

Now let's get to the non-recourse loan feature of the brand spanking new--Tim GeithnerToxic Asset Disposal Plan for Banks. These numbers are a bit bigger and the terms while fantastic are not quite as good as a zero down subprime loan.

Let's say you and your buddies decide to buy about $100 million of the sub prime crap that is laying around in your favorite neighborhood bank. The bank can't find buyers for this stuff at a real price, so your Uncle Sammy is going to give you the opportunity of a lifetime.

Now let's say you decide those $100 million of subprime loans are now worth $70 million (at this point your banker is out having a $600 lunch and thinking once again--there is a sucker born every minute). Little note here: I am going to round off the numbers to make this easy to understand.

To get control of those $70 million in subprime mortgages you will need to put up 5 million bucks. Uncle Sammy is going to put up 5 million bucks right along with you--you are now partners with Uncle Sammy (dig that).

Here is the good part--Uncle Sammy's little brother, the FDIC, is going to lend this partnership 60 million bucks. And guess what, if things don't work out, you throw the keys on the table, walk away, and tell the FDIC--eat a banana. Just like the subprime borrower. In other words, you don't have to pay back the loan which was non-recourse.

Now let's say those $70 million of subprime loans you bought actually go up in price. Walla. Windfall profit. Let's dream big and say they go all the way back up to $90 million. Here is what happens.

The little brother FDIC gets his $60 million back (and a tiny amount of interest so he doesn't feel like a complete fool). The remaining $20 million is split equally between you and Uncle Sammy. You got it. You risked $5 million and you made $10 million. A 200 percent return.

On the other hand--if those $70 million in sub prime loans you bought go to zero--the most you can lose is your original $5 million. In other words, Uncle Sammy losses $5 million, you lose $5 million, and the dumb banker, in this case the FDIC, losses $60 million.

I am going to stop here because I learned a long time ago that it is hard to get anyone on the Internet to read more than 600 words in one bite. But, I promise you there is more to this that I would like to discuss with you. So come back later for part two.

While you are at it, email this to someone you know that likes to make comments. We need some comments in here. And remember, Don't Fight the Tape.

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Michael Lewis is best known for his books Liar's Poker, The New New Thing,  and Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game.  Lewis started his career in finance as a bond trader at Solomon Brothers. In Liar's Poker he gave a first-person account of how bond traders and salesmen truly work, their personalities, and their culture. The account was less than flattering to most and lead Lewis to conclude that anyone could make millions on Wall Street if they were in the "right place at the right time".

In this new article, The End of the Wall Street Boom, Lewis gives the best account of of the subprime mortgage business and the "phoney baloney" use of credit default swaps currently available. He delves into the craziness of it all and names many of the key players. It is a very good description of greed gone wrong.

I had been waiting for the end of Wall Street. The outrageous bonuses, the slender returns to shareholders, the never-ending scandals, the bursting of the internet bubble, the crisis following the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management: Over and over again, the big Wall Street investment banks would be, in some narrow way, discredited. Yet they just kept on growing, along with the sums of money that they doled out to 26-year-olds to perform tasks of no obvious social utility.

He couldn’t figure out exactly how the rating agencies justified turning BBB loans into AAA-rated bonds. “I didn’t understand how they were turning all this garbage into gold".

The reason they did this was that the rating agencies, presented with the pile of bonds backed by dubious loans, would pronounce most of them AAA. These bonds could then be sold to investors—pension funds, insurance companies—who were allowed to invest only in highly rated securities. “I cannot fucking believe this is allowed—I must have said that a thousand times in the past two years,” Eisman says.

“We have a simple thesis,” Eisman explained. “There is going to be a calamity, and whenever there is a calamity, Merrill is there.”

This was what they had been waiting for: total collapse. “The investment-banking industry is fucked,” Eisman had told me a few weeks earlier. “These guys are only beginning to understand how fucked they are. It’s like being a Scholastic, prior to Newton. Newton comes along, and one morning you wake up: ‘Holy shit, I’m wrong!’ ” Now Lehman Brothers had vanished, Merrill had surrendered, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were just a week away from ceasing to be investment banks. The investment banks were not just fucked; they were extinct.

The End of the Wall Street Boom

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